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Bombs and Border Crossings: Peace Activist Networks and the Post-
colonial State in Africa, 1959-62 
  
Rob Skinner (University of Bristol) 
 
On 9th December 1959, a small convoy of vehicles left the settlement of Navrongo, on the 
border of Ghana and Upper Volta, and headed north. The convoy’s passengers comprised an 
international team of peace campaigners, including the British anti-colonial cleric, Michael Scott, a 
French member of War Resisters International, Pierre Martin, and US peace campaigner and civil 
rights activist, Bayard Rustin. The veteran US pacifist A.J. Muste had accompanied the team to the 
border before returning to the town of Bawku to report on their progress. The aim of the convoy 
was to travel the thousand miles or so across the Francophone territories of the Sahel and southern 
Sahara until they reached the military base at Reggane in Algeria, the site of impending French 
nuclear weapons tests. Passing the borderline unnoticed, ‘out in a near-desert no-man’s land’, it was 
not until the convoy had travelled sixteen miles into Upper Volta and reached the town of Bittou 
that police signalled the convoy to halt. As discussions took place, locals gathered around, clearly 
aware of what had brought the strange group into their midst, and equally clear in their ambivalence 
towards the French bomb test. ‘If it’s harmless’, one observer suggested, ‘why not hold it in the 
country outside Paris, so that all the French people can see the wonder!’1   The situation quickly 
developed into a stalemate. Armed police surrounded the convoy, and the stand-off lasted several 
days before the team retreated to Ghana. A smaller second group returned at the end of December 
and held a vigil at the border-post for two weeks, before they in turn were sent back to Ghana. In a 
final attempt, this time on foot, the team managed to hitch-hike as far as Tenkodogo, sixty miles 
inside Upper Volta, before they found themselves again in the hands of French police.   
The efforts of the Sahara protest appeared to have helped focus international public attention 
on the French tests.  As the team made repeated attempts to cross the border, public demonstrations 
of support were organised in Africa, Europe and the United States. Pierre Martin returned to Accra 
and held a fast outside the French Embassy, while Nigerian team-member Hilary Arinze followed 
suit outside the French Consulate in Lagos. Pickets were held at French government buildings in 
London, New York and Hamburg and as the date of the test approached, large rallies were held in 
Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, and 500 African students were arrested in Paris at a demonstration on 
                                                
1 Muste, A. J. ‘Memo for Liberation’, December 12, 1959. Swarthmore College Peace Collection (SPC) Muste 
Papers, 89/16/Sahara Protest Team.  
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11th February.2 Following the detonation of the bomb, Gerboise Bleue, on 13th February, the protest 
team returned to Accra and sought to persuade officials in Ghana to maintain international pressure 
against the French test programme. Following discussions with the team, the Ghanaian Prime 
Minister, Kwame Nkrumah called an emergency meeting of African states to discuss the nuclear 
tests alongside ‘the new form of colonialism and its attempt to Balkanize the continent and destroy 
African unity’.3  At the conference, held in Accra in April 1960, opposition to French nuclear 
weapons tests, which had originated as an attempt to mobilise European anti-nuclear campaigns, 
had metamorphosed into a pan-African protest against ‘nuclear imperialism’ and neo-colonialism. 
The unsuccessful border crossings of the Sahara protest team provide an informative starting 
point for a wider discussion of transnational peace activism in the early 1960s. As a collaboration 
between the Ghanaian government, the British Direct Action Committee (DAC) and the US 
Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), this was without doubt an event that was shaped by 
connections across national boundaries.  However, before defining the framework in which these 
connections are to be explored, a brief note on the nature and viability of transnational history is 
required. Discussions of the merits (or otherwise) of a transnational approach invariably depart 
from a consideration of the relationship and distinctions between ‘transnational’, ‘global’ and 
‘world’ history.4  My contention is that  a transnational approach is best understood as a 
methodological requirement when seeking a global perspective on post-1945 history. The 
transnational connections between European, US and African disarmament movements must be 
placed centre stage in a global history of anti-nuclear weapons movements of the early 1960s. As 
Isabel Hofmeyr has suggested, not only are ‘historical processes … made in different places but that 
they are constructed in the movement between places, sites, and regions’.5 While histories of the 
emergence of popular movements opposed to nuclear weapons have taken account of their 
international dimensions, there continues to be a tendency to define the scope of enquiry by 
particular national or regional criteria.6 The transnational dimensions of what was understood as a 
threat of global proportions, remain under-explored.  
                                                
2 April Carter, ‘The Sahara Protest Team’, in A Paul Hare and Herbert H. Blumberg, eds., Liberation without 
violence: a third-party approach (Collings: London, 1977) pp. 137; 140. 
3 ‘Cable Received from Accra’, March 6, 1960. Archives of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War, 
University of Bradford (DAC) 5/7/20. 
4  See, for example, C. A Bayly, S. Beckert, M. Connelly, I. Hofmeyr, W. Kozol, and P. Seed, ‘AHR Conversation: 
On Transnational History’, The American Historical Review, 111 (December 2006), pp. 1441-1464; P. Clavin, 
‘Defining Transnationalism’, Contemporary European History, 14 (November 2005), pp. 421-439.   
5  Ibid, p. 1444.   
6  For example, Lawrence Wittner’s account of the ‘world movement’ nevertheless tends to divide international 
movements by nation, or region. The Sahara protest is therefore an example of ‘Third World’ activism in Africa, 
not of US or European activism: Lawrence Wittner, Resisting the bomb: a history of the world nuclear 
disarmament movement 1954-1970. (Stanford, 1997), pp. 266-267. 
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Meanwhile, networks that had emerged in support of anti-colonial movements were by nature 
transnational, bridging the space between international sympathizers and African political activists. 
The Sahara protest thus reveals, according to one observer, how ‘national liberation and nation-
building, pan-Africanism and the radical, transnational peace movement were constitutive political 
struggles’.7  Thanks to its status as one of the first African states to achieve independence, together 
with a political leadership strongly committed to pan-African and internationalist policies, Ghana 
was of critical international importance in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and has provided a focus 
for recent accounts setting the histories of US Civil Rights movements and African independence 
within a global social dynamics.8 And yet, the interactions between transnational peace campaigns 
and the Ghanaian state was also shaped by what Kelly and Kaplan have described as the 
‘routinization of the nation-state’; relations between peace activists and government officials were 
both enabled and constrained by decolonization.9 The history of peace activists’ interactions with 
Africa at the point of decolonization must therefore set any concerns with its transnational 
dimensions alongside those determined by the normative political entity, the nation-state.  
Furthermore, the Sahara protest and the multi-lateral conferences on ‘nuclear imperialism’ 
that followed it also illustrate the ways in which pan-African politics interacted with pan-European 
social movements. While the momentum of protest against French nuclear weapons tests in the 
Sahara was sustained by African political activity, much of the initial organizational impetus for the 
protests came from within European pacifist and anti-nuclear movements.  As such, the process of 
negotiating and engaging with the politics of African liberation reveals easily overlooked aspects of 
transnational European anti-nuclear weapons movements.  Studies of European nuclear 
disarmament movements have shown that individual movements tended to frame their campaigns 
within particular national political discourses, rather than seeking to develop broader transnational 
frames of reference. Their histories, as Nehring has argued, reveal the interconnections between the 
national and international, and must be grounded methodologically in an examination of the 
                                                
7 J. Allman, ‘Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom: Ghana, 1959–1962 1’, 
Souls, 10 (2008), pp. 84; 98. Other accounts of the Sahara protest are provided in; Carter, op. cit. ; Bill Sutherland 
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9  John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan, Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization, (Chicago, 2001), p. 
9. See also John D. Kelly and Martha Kaplan. ‘Nation and Decolonization: Toward a New Anthropology of 
Nationalism’, Anthropological Theory 1, 4 (2001), pp. 419–437. 
 4 
‘politics of communication’ across geographical borders.10 Disconnected from formal political 
organisations, transnational social movements seek to exert public influence by constructing a sense 
of identity and solidarity across borders, calling on ‘the unity of human solidarity’ in order to define 
a common ground between national movements.11 In order to take account of the more complex 
interactions between European, African and US movements evident in the protests against the 
French Sahara tests, an adjustment of focus beyond the comparative study of national movements is 
necessary. 
A study of interactions between Western and African movements needs to be carefully 
calibrated, in order to avoid superficial differentiations between identity-based social movements 
associated with cultural and social transformations in Western nation states, and ‘historical’ national 
liberation movements in the Third World. In his study of transnational anti-apartheid activism, 
Håkan Thörn has suggested that the eurocentrism implicit in new social movement theories can be 
circumvented by setting movements within a ‘global context of de-colonization’. 12 However, a 
transnational history of decolonization must also tackle interactions between organisations, 
individuals and networks that operated across national borders and those that were – or sought to be 
– engaged with more formal political processes within emerging post-colonial nation states. The 
interconnectedness of national and international movements suggests that a transnational approach 
cannot always be concerned, as some have suggested, with a view of the nation as ‘a thing 
contested, interrupted, and always shot through with contradiction’.13 I would argue that it is 
necessary instead to configure transnational histories of anti-nuclear activism in such a way as to 
foreground the complex and contradictory, but nevertheless significant connections across borders 
that were re-shaped by the process of decolonization. In order to historicize transnational anti-
colonial or anti-nuclear peace movements in the ‘context of decolonization’, one must begin with 
the recognition that their activities were the bound up with the politics of the post-colonial State. 
Lastly, it is also valuable to consider the most useful form in which transnational interactions 
should be conceived. Studies from the perspective of political science and international relations 
have tended in the past to focus on networks as a form of structure that sustains and channels 
                                                
10 Nehring, H. Nehring, ‘National Internationalists: British and West German Protests against Nuclear Weapons, the 
Politics of Transnational Communications and the Social History of the Cold War, 1957-1964,’ Contemporary 
European History, 14 (November 2005), pp. 559-582.  See also H. Nehring, ‘The British and West German protests 
against nuclear weapons and anti-colonialism, 1956-64’, Socialist History Journal, 31 (2007), pp. 9-39. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Without this perspective, new social movement theories run the risk of reproducing a teleological  model of 
‘modernization’. See Håkan Thörn, Anti-apartheid and the emergence of a global civil society (Basingstoke, 2006), 
pp. 8-10.  
13 Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J. T. Way, ‘Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis’, American 
Quarterly, 60 (September 2008), p 627. 
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transnational activism.14 This article suggests that a looser and more fluid conception of networks is 
required when assessing engagement between social movements and post-colonial African states. In 
this regard, it follows the definition of network, suggested by Frederick Cooper, which centres on 
‘forms of affiliation and association that are less defined than a “structure” but more than just a 
collection of individuals engaging in transactions’.15 Networks provide a more durable focus for a 
study of transnational peace activism than the more diffuse concept of social movements. As Sidney 
Tarrow has suggested, transnational social movements, as a form of contentious politics, are ‘hard 
to construct, are difficult to maintain, and have very different relations to states and international 
institutions than the less contentious family of international NGOs or activist networks’.16  Social 
movements cohere around collective identities that crystallise around shared values and the 
construction of communities based on mutual trust; where movements interact across national 
boundaries this process can both inject new forms of meaning into the movement but also result in a 
fragile, imagined solidarity that is unable to provide a stable platform for lasting transnational 
movements. In the context of decolonization, however, transnational activism was manifest in the 
form of interconnected networks, not the formation of imagined communities of activists. What 
follows is an exploration of the development of these networks in the years following the Sahara 
protest, adding detail to historical understanding of the relationship between transnational activism, 
social movements, and the post-colonial nation-state.  
 
 
Plans for a protest against the French atomic weapons programme were first raised by DAC 
delegates at the European Congress for Nuclear Disarmament, held in London in January 1959. 
They believed that an international protest would have ‘greater imaginative appeal’ than one 
launched in France alone, and would ‘symbolise our common concern about the threat of nuclear 
weapons’.17 After a sceptical response from the French delegation, the DAC were persuaded to 
shelve the campaign. Then, in June 1959, when the French authorities announced that a test site was 
                                                
14   The obligatory reference in this context is to Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: 
advocacy networks in international politics (Ithaca, 1998).  See also S. P. Huntington, ‘Transnational Organizations 
in World Politics’, World Politics, 25 (April 1973), pp. 333-368; K. Sikkink, ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue-
Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America’, International Organization, 47 (July 1993), pp. 411-441; K. Sikkink, 
‘Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 31 
(September 1998), pp. 517-523; A. Klotz, ‘Transnational Activism and Global Transformations: The Anti-
Apartheid and Abolitionist Experiences’, European Journal of International Relations, 8 (March 2002), pp. 49-76.    
15  Frederick Cooper, ‘Networks, Moral Discourse and History’, in Callaghy, Kassimir and Latham, Intervention and 
Transnationalism in Africa: Global-local Networks of Power, (Cambridge, 2001), p. 24.  
16 S. Tarrow, ‘Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics’, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 4 (June 2001), pp. 1-20. 
17 P.  Arrowsmith  to L. Frobenius, January 12, 1959.  DAC 5/7/1; ‘Untitled Memo for European Congress’, n.d. 
[January 1959].  DAC 5/7/1.. 
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being constructed at Reggane in southern Algeria the DAC revived the idea.18 At the end of August, 
working in collaboration with the London-based anti-colonial Committee of African Organisations 
(CAO), the group organised a demonstration in London to protest against what they described as 
French ‘nuclear imperialism’. Despite a heat wave that ‘had driven all but a few disconsolate 
tourists from the hot pavements’, around 2000 protesters attended a rally in Trafalgar Square, while 
a smaller number picketed the French Embassy.19 However, the collaboration between the DAC and 
the CAO dissipated soon after the rally, and the peace activists turned instead to the support of 
organisations in Europe and the United States. 
In the formation of a viable transnational campaign against the French tests, the African-
American activist Bill Sutherland became a vital conduit between European movements, US 
pacifist networks and the Ghanaian government. Having worked in Ghana since the mid-1950s, he 
had been instrumental in the formation of the Ghana Council for Nuclear Disarmament in August 
1959, and was influential in the decision of the CNVA to back the Sahara protest team and send 
Rustin to Ghana in October 1959.20 As a key aide of the Finance Minister and one of Nkrumah’s 
closest allies, Komla Gbedemah, Sutherland was well-placed to facilitate contacts between British, 
African and US campaigners. Despite their initial reluctance, the support of CNVA is less 
surprising given the similarities in approach and political philosophy between it and the DAC. Cited 
as an influence on the DAC and described as its ‘sister organisation’ by April Carter, the emergence 
and development of the CNVA depended on a web of transnational connections shared with its 
British counterpart, including Quaker networks, the Christian pacifist organisation the International 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, and War Resisters International.21 It was trans-Atlantic and pan-
African networks with well-established connections, in contrast to more diffuse European anti-
nuclear organisations, that shaped the international response to the French tests.      
In particular, there appear to have been few comparable links between French anti-nuclear 
campaigners and the DAC. In September, less than a month before team members began to arrive in 
Accra, April Carter herself admitted that she had no knowledge of how ‘the French anti-atomic 
armament organisation argues its case’.22  In fact, the French delegates who had attended the 
London Congress, and taken a leading role in the formation of the French Federation Against 
Atomic Armament in April 1959 had begun to articulate opposition to the tests, and in similar terms 
                                                
18 A. Carter to V. Hamers-Camatta, June 17, 1959  DAC 5/7/1.  
19 ‘London Letter’, The Guardian, 31 August 1959; Times, 31 August 1959; ‘Africa Says No to French Tests’, August 
1959,  DAC/5/7/7. 
20 Lawrence  Wittner, op. cit., p. 266; ‘Minutes of CNVA Committee Meeting’, October 6, 1959. SPC Muste Papers, 
Reel 89/16/Sahara Protest Team. 
21 Lawrence Wittner op. cit. 
22 A. Carter to A. Hamers and V. Hamers-Camatta, September 2, 1959. DAC 5/7/1.  
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to those used by British campaigners.  Chief among those were the editor of France-Observateur 
Claude Bourdet and the pacifist Pastor Andre Trocmé, co-President of the Federation alongside the 
physicist Alfred Kastler. From the summer of 1959, the group began to co-ordinate a national 
campaign against the tests, including a petition signed in the main by academics and church 
officials.23 However, with its audience being an intellectual elite, the French Federation was unable 
to generate a coherent mass response to the initial French tests.  
One explanation for the failure to build a popular campaign in France cites nationalist 
sentiment; the desire to maintain – or regain – national prestige through a nuclear weapons 
programme.24 This, together with the belief that support for a British-led campaign was complicity 
in ‘foreign interference’, underpinned the lack of French public enthusiasm for the Sahara project. 
Trocmé argued firmly that protests against the French tests needed to be ‘genuinely French, 
organised by the French, with the approval of French popular good sense’.25 Nor were French 
attitudes to the Sahara protest plan softened by the picket of the French embassy in London that 
coincided with the Trafalgar Square rally – a point that was made by French activists to Michael 
Randle at a meeting in Paris shortly before his departure to Ghana. Despite the lack of ‘official’ 
backing from French anti-nuclear movements, the protest team were joined by two French 
members: Esther Peter, a translator for the Council of Europe, and Pierre Martin, a member of War 
Resisters International and the humanitarian organisation Service Civil International, who had been 
working for UNESCO in Ghana. Eventually – after protracted discussions and, in Kastler’s case, 
with great reluctance – the Federation leadership agreed to write to the French Foreign Minister, 
requesting that visas be granted to the protest team.26  But essentially, French participation in the 
protest was confined to the individual contributions of Esther Peter and Pierre Martin. The 
transnational connections that brought the Sahara protest team together were therefore rooted in 
post-war international pacifist and humanitarian networks, rather than a cross-border alliance of 
anti-nuclear movements.    
Protests against the French tests had brought British and US anti-nuclear pacifists into 
alliance with African anti-colonial campaigners who explicitly connected the history of ‘centuries 
of slavery and imperial exploitation’ with ‘the pollution of our air with radioactive fallout’.27  In 
contrast, French activists had sought to downplay the colonial dimension of the protest. The tests 
took place at a delicate moment in the ‘endgame’ of the Algerian war, only months after de Gaulle 
                                                
23 Lawrence Wittner, op. cit., pp. 230-231. 
24  Ibid. 
25 Trocmé, quoted in A. Carter, op. cit., p. 152.  
26 E. Peter to A. J. Muste, January 1, 1960. SPC, Muste Papers, Reel 89/16/Sahara Protest Team. 
27 ‘London Letter’, The Guardian, 31 August 1959; Times, 31 August 1959; ‘Africa Says No to French Tests’, August 
1959, DAC 5/7/7. 
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had accepted that self-determination would play a role in defining the future status of Algeria, and it 
is striking that the detonation of an atomic bomb in the territory does not appear to have figured in 
public debate.28 French public opinion appeared wary of ‘extremist’ opposition to the war, which 
goes some way to explain why the Sahara protest was rebuffed by the French delegates at the 
London Congress, fearful that it would be dismissed as ‘Communist or anti-colonialist inspired’.29 
French opposition to the tests was articulated by a small body of pacifist campaigners morally and 
politically opposed to anything that hinted of a connection with the FLN and its violent struggle 
against French colonialism. The non-Communist left in France were, arguably, far from ‘anti-
colonial’ in their perceptions of the struggle in Algeria, although at least one prominent figure was 
prepared to speak positively about the Sahara protest in private.30 British campaigners nevertheless 
understood that the protest had to be insulated from any commentary on the war in Algeria to avoid 
alienating French opinion. In the context of a protest against French militarism, a ‘complete pacifist 
demand’ - that is, a campaign that embraced a call for an end to all violence in Algeria – was 
rejected as unworkable.31  
Colonial issues were embedded in rather different ways within British anti-nuclear weapons 
protests, which were, in the eyes of some commentators, suffused with ‘imperialist pacifism’ and 
nationalist ‘romantic protest’.32 Campaigners for nuclear disarmament presented their movement as 
a pathway towards national redemption and the restoration of international power and prestige, with 
a non-nuclear Britain destined to become a neutral mediator between the Cold War superpowers 
and emergent ‘non-aligned’ nations.33  In the wake of the Sahara protest, Michael Randle claimed 
that ‘he had become an ambassador for radical Britain’, and took Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
to task for not condemning the French tests during his tour of Africa in early 1960.34   But the sense 
of moral authority that characterised much of the support for the campaign also revealed more 
traditionalist elements within the disarmament movement. The marchers who joined the annual 
Easter pilgrimage from the atomic weapons research facility in Aldermaston to Trafalgar Square in 
London were, according to David Marquand, ‘the lineal descendants of pious, upstanding Victorian 
                                                
28 Martin Evans, Algeria: France’s undeclared war (Oxford, 2011), pp. 261-282. 
29 A. Carter to V. Hamers-Camatta, June 17, 1959. DAC 5/7/1. 
30 According to A.J. Muste, the former Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès-France expressed ‘admiration’ for the protest 
team during a lecture tour in the United States in early 1960. A.J. Muste to E. Peter, January 28, 1960 SPC, Muste 
Papers , Reel 89/16/Sahara Protest Team. On the ‘non-Communist Left’ and Algeria, see, for example, Todd 
Shepard, The invention of decolonization: the Algerian War and the remaking of France (Ithaca, 2006), pp.  64-65. 
31  A. Carter to Arno & Vera Hamers-Camatta, September 2, 1959, DAC 5/7/1. 
32 On ‘imperialist pacifism’ James Hinton, Protests and visions: peace politics in twentieth-century Britain (London, 
1989). On ‘romantic protest’, see Meredith Veldman, Fantasy, the Bomb and the Greening of Britain: Romantic 
Protest, 1945-1980 (Cambridge, 1994), p. 120. 
33 Ibid, p. 138. 
34 A. Carter, op. cit. , p. 148. 
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pastors who thundered out against Bulgarian atrocities’. While he accepted that anti-nuclear 
weapons campaigners talked the ‘language of internationalism’, they did so with nationalist pride. 35   
Holger Nehring has argued that, in contrast to West German protesters, British peace 
campaigners’ references to an imperial past should not suggest inherent and crude traditionalism, 
but that the identity of British social movements could be expressed within, rather than in 
opposition to, a discourse of nationhood.36 In stating, as some reportedly did, that the Aldermaston 
March ‘was a kind of civilizing mission’ it seemed that anti-nuclear protesters in Britain could 
articulate their moral purpose in a voice that would not have been out of place in the colonial 
service.37   And yet, in the case of the Sahara protest, the ability to combine nationalist sentiments 
with an internationalist frame was attenuated by the encounter between political cultures in the 
throes of decolonization – the contrasting conditions of French and British imperial disengagement 
in Africa made the organisation of viable unified action against the tests highly unlikely. European 
social movements in the 1950s and 1960s were moulded by national political cultures, setting limits 
to the establishment of effective transnational communication. The difficulties evident in the case of 
relations between European movements were, however, of a different order to those associated with 
connections between Western and African movements. 
 
In January 1960, Michael Scott left Ghana to attend the second All-African People’s 
Conference, held in Tunisia, hoping to elicit continued support from African leaders.  Scott 
focussed his efforts on persuading Nkrumah in particular, with apparent success when in March 
1960, The Ghana Prime Minister’s Office issued a press-release announcing plans for an 
‘emergency conference of independent African states’ to discuss nuclear weapons tests and other 
‘neo-colonial’ threats.38  On Scott’s recommendation, Michael Randle remained in Accra to assist 
with the organisation of the conference, working out of the office of Nkrumah’s Bureau of African 
Affairs. Randle was keen that the conference should be seen as an ‘African initiative’, rather than 
‘an attempt by “Westerners” to import and impose their own ideas’.39 Moreover, as Sutherland 
noted, the mood at pan-African meetings suggested that African leaders were disillusioned by 
international organisations and had begun to feel obliged to ‘do something on their own’.40 As a 
consequence, the Accra conference set opposition to nuclear weapons firmly within an anti-colonial 
rhetoric of opposition to French ‘nuclear imperialism’. Language of that kind was perhaps 
                                                
35 D. Marquand, ‘England, the Bomb, the Marchers’. Commentary, May 1960, pp. 382; 385. 
36 H. Nehring, (2007), op. cit., p. 28. 
37 M. Veldman, op. cit. 
38 M. Randle to DAC, 6 March 1960, DAC 5/7/20.  
39 M. Randle, ‘Some Notes on the Positive Action Conference to Be Held in Accra’, March 20, 1960. DAC 5/7/20. 
40 W. Sutherland to A.J. Muste, 3 March 1960, SPC, Muste Papers, Reel 89/7/African conference on nonviolence. 
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unsurprising in the context of decolonisation, and it also reflected a palpable sense of a 
contemporary crisis in European colonialism. In Algeria, the ‘week of the barricades’ in January 
1960 had demonstrated that factions were determined to oppose de Gaulle’s plans, by force if 
necessary; meanwhile in March of that year, images of demonstrators shot by police in the South 
African township of Sharpeville outraged African – and world – opinion.  From an African 
perspective, it was not possible to disaggregate the issue of nuclear tests from the emotions of anti-
colonialism; as the Zambian nationalist leader Mainza Chona put it, the French tests were ‘both 
murder in cold blood as well as criminal trespass on our mother Africa’.41 
Such sentiments in part reflected widespread public fears over the material effects of the 
detonation of an atomic weapon in Africa by a colonial power. When African leaders expressed 
their ‘indignation’ when plans for the Sahara tests were officially announced in August 1959, the 
French government claimed that ‘for several hundred miles around the testing ground there is no 
population centre and indeed hardly a single human being’.42  In response, the French ethnographer 
Odette du Puigaudeau wrote of the test-site at Reggane as part of a chain of oases that stretched 
toward the Moroccan border.43 Official protests from African leaders were accompanied by public 
demonstrations in west Africa, heightened by the publication of images of survivors of Hiroshima. 
Public anxieties in Nigeria were particularly extensive, with the Christian Council of Nigeria 
voicing concerns that ‘atomic particles’ would be carried by the prevailing wind into the country, 
while the Federation of Nigerian Women's Organisations were reported to have sent a telegram to 
Queen Elizabeth II, asking her to ‘protect the lives of Nigerian sons and daughters by appealing to 
the French government’.44 Meanwhile, the University of Ibadan issued a statement expressing 
concern over contamination of the cereal crops upon which both human populations and their 
livestock were dependent.45  
Popular anxieties over pollution thus contributed to African responses to the tests. In Michael 
Randle’s view, however, they were shaped predominantly by ‘resentment of yet another colonialist 
outrage in Africa’, rather than anti-nuclear pacifism. Failure to take account of the colonial 
dimension would, he felt remove the issue from its necessary ‘historical context’.46   Transnational 
solidarity could not, however, crystallise around the anti-nuclear issue alone, and western 
campaigners appeared unwilling to compromise their principles of non-violence in the service of 
anti-colonialism. They sought instead to emphasize ‘the importance of the non-violent tradition in 
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the liberation struggle in Africa’ and ‘find responsible African leaders to play a leading part’.47  
When it came to the question of non-violence, western peace campaigners, despite having become 
attuned to the patterns of anti-colonial thought, were unable to relinquish the desire to shape 
discussion along the lines of their own ideological principles.    
In the eyes of campaigners such as Scott and Sutherland, the moral force of the African 
revolution had been characterised by its tactics of non-violence. It had underpinned their support, 
and was a fundamental element of their own political philosophies.48 In Ghana, the group were able 
to draw on sympathy and support from official channels, not least Nkrumah, who had championed a 
repertoire of non-violent tactics under the slogan of ‘Positive Action’ as the cornerstone of his 
leadership of the Gold Coast independence movement in the 1950s. The tactic appeared to echo the 
notions of Gandhian non-violent action that similarly inspired the DAC.49 However, at the Tunis 
conference, advocates of a militant approach to liberation had scored a victory with a resolution 
calling for the formation of a volunteer brigade to fight alongside the FLN in Algeria.50  Opening 
the Accra conference in April, however, Nkrumah repeatedly returned to the principle of ‘positive 
action’, re-framing it as a foundational principle for non-aligned politics ‘in an age of nuclear 
madness and apartheid arrogance’. Nkrumah claimed non-violent positive action was ‘the greatest 
single hope for peace, security and brotherhood among mankind’.51  Nevertheless, fears over the 
influence of what Sutherland called the ‘violence boys’ was growing within the circuits of the 
transnational peace movement, and the conference in Accra did little to alleviate those anxieties.  
Again, the Algerian war lay at the centre of these tensions. In the speeches and comments of 
delegates at Accra, a clear distinction was drawn between French colonial violence, which was 
condemned on all sides, and the violence adopted by what the representative of the World Peace 
Council called the ‘magnificent liberation army of Algeria’.52 One of the most well-received 
speeches at the conference, impressing western and African delegates in equal measure, was given 
by the subsequent philosopher of anti-colonial liberation, Frantz Fanon.53 Fanon explained that non-
violent protest had brought only vicious retribution and that, while colonial violence ‘must first be 
fought by truth and reason’, continued oppression had created ‘inner violence in the oppressed’ that 
ultimately led to ‘purely animal’ acts of self-preservation.54 Western peace-campaigners had come 
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to Accra with the hope that international solidarity against nuclear weapons might provide a 
platform for a new era of peaceful co-operation; instead a new vision of liberation was emerging, 
centred on a sense of African solidarity rather than affinities with transnational pacifism.    
Pan-Africanist sentiment exposed fault lines in the transnational politics of anti-nuclear 
weapons movements. When the Sahara protest team had gathered in Accra in late 1959, the 
Ghanaian authorities had insisted that a ‘working committee’ was formed, which excluded Randle 
from its discussions.55 Understandable fears of ‘neo-colonialism’ thus began to shape the 
relationship between western activists and African officials. These fears surfaced again at the 
‘Positive Action’ conference. Many African delegates found the presence of Westerners advocating 
passive resistance far from welcome, while Western observers felt the conference speeches 
expressed rather too much visceral anti-French sentiment.56 Walter Birmingham reported that the 
conference committee on Algeria had, on Fanon’s insistence, refused to allow Pierre Martin a 
hearing, while both Martin and Esther Peter were suspected of acting as French ‘spies’.57  The 
conference heard expressions of antipathy towards France, calls for increased international pressure, 
economic sanctions and boycotts against French goods and assets, and a specific plea for support 
from the peoples of the French African community. The conference speeches and resolutions reveal 
feelings of identification against imperial and colonial power, rather than universal human 
solidarity.   
Despite the attention given to the crises in Algeria and South Africa, efforts were made to 
rekindle the anti-nuclear campaign that had provided the original impetus for the conference. Calls 
were made for a thousand African volunteers to form an enlarged Sahara protest, while plans were 
mooted to deploy African students in Europe as potential interlocutors between pan-African and 
western peace movements.58 And, at the heart of Nkrumah’s conference address was a pledge to 
fund a training centre where ‘volunteers would learn the essential disciplines of concerted positive 
action’.59 After the conference, Scott, Sutherland and Randle began to consult with the Ghanaian 
authorities on a centre for non-violent resistance in the coastal town of Winneba.60  There were, 
however, significant difficulties for the establishment of a successful training centre, not least the 
perceived dangers of too close an affiliation with government. As April Carter observed, ‘at some 
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stage the non-violent ideal will clash openly with power politics, and the government concerned 
will have to choose between the two’.61 Scott had envisaged the centre as a place for ‘those who 
want to find the right means of struggle in the coming age of nuclear power and neo-imperialism’, 
but the plans were transformed into an institution for training anti-colonial activists, a kind of non-
violent variant of the military training camps that were being established to support liberation 
movements in Africa.62  
The plans for the Winneba centre were soon sidetracked by events elsewhere in Africa. By 
July 1960, with the Ghanaian army heavily committed as peacekeepers in the Congo, Nkrumah’s 
interest appeared to have waned.  Sutherland explained this as a consequence of the nature of the 
Congo crisis, in which Nkrumah sensed little significant role for non-violent activists – this was 
itself something of an indictment of the plans. Furthermore, he felt that Nkrumah had come under 
the influence of Marxists who saw non-violence as ‘fuzzy do-goodism which will lose Nkrumah the 
leadership of Africa’.63 In September 1960, it became clear that the non-violent ‘positive action’ 
centre was to be subsumed within a college for trade union leaders and CPP party members. As 
Muste pointed out, there was little chance of international peace movements becoming involved ‘in 
an institute responsible to the Central Committee of the CCP [sic]’.64 In response to suggestions that 
he and Sutherland might consider teaching posts at the new institute, Randle wrote to Nkrumah 
outlining his thoughts on the relationship between peace activists and State institutions. He 
acknowledged that the State was obliged to respond to situations ‘with the resources available to it’, 
and that the use of the military might at times be ‘constructive in character’. Here, he drew a 
distinction between African contributions to the UN force in the Congo and the ‘unconstructive’ 
creation of nuclear forces by Britain and France. Nevertheless, he informed Nkrumah, his belief in 
non-violent action went beyond ‘purely tactical considerations’ and his involvement in the training 
centre would depend on him maintaining ‘independence of opinion’.65 But before the centre was 
established, Randle was recalled to the UK to support Scott and Bertrand Russell in the formation 
of a direct-action break-away from CND, the Committee of 100.66    
On one level, the fate of the Winneba Centre embodied in microcosm the shift from non-
violence to armed struggle that was underway within African liberation movements. However, the 
episode also suggests that the failure to build transnational connections stemmed from the capacity 
for national and racial identities to over-ride the construction of a solidarity centred on ideological 
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affinities and moral principles. As Allman has shown, presenting the Sahara protest in terms of 
‘Black internationalism’ and what Kevin Gaines called a ‘transnational culture of opposition’ to 
western colonialism, is relatively straightforward, and reminds us that pan-African activist networks 
provided a foundation for global social protest.67 And yet, the discontinuities between networks that 
are revealed in an examination of the Sahara protest were not simply a black and white issue.  
At the ‘Positive Action’ conference, Arab and Anglophone African opposition to the tests was 
contrasted with an apparent lack of protest from French West Africa, although there had in fact 
been vocal opposition to the tests from Francophone African political leaders.68  Similarly, African-
American activists such as Rustin and Sutherland were drawn to the campaign as much through 
their participation in international pacifist networks as a sense of racial solidarity. In the eyes of one 
biographer, Rustin was ‘was attracted to the measured style and quiet self-assurance of a certain 
type and class of the English person’, suggesting patrician qualities that promoted identification 
with the British middle-classes as much as African political leaders.69 Moreover, as Allman herself 
shows, Rustin and Sutherland had long-standing connections with British pacifists, which facilitated 
movement between Africa, the United States and Britain. These were multi-stranded transnational 
connections that circumvented some of the ideological and cultural discontinuities exposed in the 
Accra conference of 1960. The campaign against French nuclear tests was was not shaped by the 
formation of transnational communities centred on imagined and racial solidarities, but instead 
through transnational connections facilitated by ‘issue networks’.70 
 
Historical interpretations of the politics of protests against the first French nuclear weapons 
tests might therefore lead to a critical account of the limits of a transnational approach, or at least an 
account affords such considerations only a limited value. In empirical terms, the Sahara protest was 
shaped by the interaction of European, African and North American campaigners embedded in 
transnational pacifist networks, but beyond that, the campaign’s failure to break down national 
boundaries was evident. In terms of the politics of anti-nuclear weapons protest, nationalist 
sentiment tended to shape engagement with international campaigns. But supra-national 
organisations continued to play an influential role in setting the parameters of debates around 
nuclear weapons and imperialism, albeit in a somewhat different register than that of the Sahara 
protest. Thus, when discussions around disarmament and nuclear arms control returned to Accra 
two years after the ‘Positive Action’ conference, a very different form of transnational politics was 
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in play.  
Nkrumah had remained committed to world disarmament, and argued that the vast sums spent 
on developing nuclear weapons could be more usefully spent on developing the economies of the 
states emerging from imperial control.71 He became closely engaged with the early development of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, and had attended the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries 
in September 1961. And, although independent African states had split into a ‘Brazzaville Group’ 
of former French territories and ‘Casablanca Group’ of north African and Anglophone territories, 
Nkrumah continued to promote African unity as a necessary foundation for world peace.72 
Following a meeting between Nkrumah and CND Chair Canon Collins in 1961, plans were put in 
place for a conference of non-aligned peace movements, sponsored by CND and the European 
Federation, but hosted by Ghana.73 Some potential participants were guarded and noted the 
potential dangers of organising an international peace conference in Ghana when the country’s 
internal politics was increasingly troubled. Gbedemah, the most committed anti-nuclear activist 
within Nkrumah’s circle, has fallen out of favour and was reported to be in hiding, while Bill 
Sutherland had left the country. An international conference would thus be of advantage to 
Nkrumah domestically in ways the 1960 event had not.74  
A preparatory meeting took place in Zagreb in February 1962, and the tone of the planning 
documents – in which emphasis was given to the fact that participants were not ‘attending in a 
representative capacity’ or ‘bound to any vote’ seem to demonstrate a desire to insulate the meeting 
from east-west tensions.75 The Assembly was designed as a conference of non-aligned movements, 
but, in the event (and notwithstanding their nominal unrepresentative status) the largest delegations 
hailed from the United States and the Soviet Union.  These included figures with official 
connections, such as the former US Ambassador to the UN, James Wadsworth. The meeting was 
also attended by Homer Jack, a director of the US National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, 
whose presence was welcomed by William Foster, the Director of the newly-formed US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Foster, while careful to acknowledge that Jack would not 
represent the US in any official capacity, was clearly comfortable with the contribution he felt Jack 
would make to the conference, writing that ‘it will have a salutary effect if you state your views as 
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your conscience prompts you’.76 In general, delegates to the Assembly represented groups engaged 
in political lobbying, rather than direct action; while Nkrumah had worked closely with Randle and 
Scott, who had central positions in the organisation of the Committee of 100, it the Chair of CND, 
Canon John Collins, who represented British peace movements at the Accra Assembly.  
Given the multiplicity of interests that were brought together, the overall message of the 
Assembly was somewhat blurred. The Assembly addressed a number of themes, some of which 
were presaged in the opening address by Nkrumah, who declared that the ‘cold war mentality 
should be kept out of Africa’, adding that post-war tensions were rooted in ideological conflict, 
colonialism and the possession of weapons of mass destruction, and an ‘impartial inspection team’ 
should be formed as a way of breaking the impasse in the Geneva disarmament talks.77  Perhaps the 
most crucial issue addressed by the Assembly was that of the principle and processes of nuclear 
disarmament. The principle was discussed by the first committee, which explored the ‘reduction of 
international tensions’, made a number of recommendations regarding possible limitations on the 
further extension of nuclear weapons.  It also courted controversy by calling for the Taipei-based 
Republic of China to be excluded from the UN, and condemned the European Common Market as 
‘economic discrimination’ and the ‘extension of the cold war into the field of trade’. Both 
statements were deleted from the final report.78  
The Assembly also explored the relationship between disarmament and development.  Joseph 
Henry Mensah, who had returned from a post at the UN to work as a senior economist at the 
Planning Commission of Ghana, suggested that discussion of the economic costs of disarmament 
needed to focus as much on non-nuclear militarisation in Africa as it did on the arms race between 
superpowers. ‘The world in which the great powers renounce their big bombs’, he argued, ‘must 
also be a world in which the smaller powers renounce their small bombs’.79  Raising the scenario of 
a ‘Balkans conflict’ in Africa, dragging the world into war, he went on to argue that military 
spending had the potential to outstrip foreign aid flows by some margin. He proposed that 
programme for disarmament in Africa be considered, that established international protection from 
aggression and allowed states to maintain armed forces only to the level ‘consistent with the ability 
of each government to maintain peace within its own borders’.  While he appreciated the hurdles to 
disarmament in Africa, Mensah maintained that ‘governments are notoriously incapable of 
appreciating the great economic burden … or the danger to the efforts in economic development’ 
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associated with armed conflict.80 
There were attempts to establish a permanent organisation to carry on the work of the 
Assembly, and an office was established in Ghana, with Frank Boaten as General Director. In this 
role, Boaten attended the Oxford Conference of Non-Aligned Peace Organizations in January 1963, 
and took the Accra Assembly proposals to the founding conference of the Organization of African 
Unity in Addis Ababa later that year. Boaten, however, recognised that he would ‘have to work 
very hard to get the conference to give serious consideration’ to his proposals.81 Another short-lived 
legacy of the Assembly emerged from committee discussions on nuclear arms control and 
inspection procedures, chaired by the Irish politician and human rights activist, Seán MacBride. 
Shortly after the Assembly, MacBride travelled to Geneva to deliver its report to national delegates 
at the ongoing disarmament talks.82 He was, along with other observers, guardedly optimistic about 
the achievements of the Assembly, and noted that the Assembly reports were well-received by the 
delegates in Geneva. One US expert suggested that the discussions in Accra had avoided the 
dangers of leaning ideologically towards either Soviet or western views. Nor was the conference, as 
British campaigners had reportedly feared, merely ‘amateurish’.83 There were, nevertheless, some 
clear reservations, including regrets that the non-aligned delegates were unable to make ‘bolder 
proposals’, with the result that committee discussions became dominated by American and Soviet 
experts and thus a ‘replica of the Geneva Disarmament conference’.84  Homer Jack noted that there 
were many ‘inevitable disappointments’, not least in the small number of African participants, but 
also the ‘failure of the Assembly as a whole to take many positive stands on outstanding cold war 
problems’.85 While western pacifists such as Jack were motivated in part by anti-communist 
convictions, cold war tensions – already a factor in the internal politics of movements such as 
SANE – were an evident constraint on international co-operation.86 The form of non-alignment 
employed by the participants, described by Jack as ‘a mathematical exercise in finding ideological 
equidistance between two poles’, was perceived to be a far from effective route to disarmament.87 
The Accra Assembly could, nevertheless, be conceivably regarded as one of the first global 
gatherings of non-aligned peace organisations, superseding regional groupings such as the 
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European Federation Against Nuclear Arms.  
Viewed in terms of the unfulfilled promise of pan-African anti-nuclear pacifism, the Accra 
Assembly might be seen as indicative of the narrowing of options for ‘the space to imagine new 
worlds’ in the context of increased cold war tensions.88  Nkrumah’s sponsorship of the Accra 
Assembly might alternatively be regarded as the moment at which the pan-African visions became 
incorporated within the formation of political structures of non-alignment. However problematic, 
compromised and ineffectual they may have been in creating a non-nuclear utopia, the discussions 
at the Accra Assembly provided a conduit between the superpowers and the non-aligned movement. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly further demonstrated the limits to transnational co-operation during the 
cold war.  
 
Transnational peace activists felt increasingly anxious about the nexus of Cold War nuclear 
rivalries and decolonization at the start of the 1960s. Responses to the French tests in the Sahara 
reveal those anxieties in sharp relief, insofar as they interwove universalist fears over the emergence 
of a new nuclear power with more particular national concerns. European activists felt such 
concerns in relation to their own particular experiences of decolonization. In the British case, these 
were embodied in the popular view that disarmament was a path back to world influence, while 
French campaigns against the tests were muted by anxieties over a more violent disengagement 
from empire. African views, meanwhile, were shaped by the fear that independence would be 
tempered by the emergence of neo-colonialism. Above all, the events in the Congo, South Africa 
and Algeria that framed the debates around ‘nuclear imperialism’ were viewed through a filter of 
Cold War anxieties. Speaking before the UN Special Committee on Colonialism in 1962, Michael 
Scott stated that the ‘world cannot be allowed to be destroyed because of constitutional failure in 
Central Africa’.89 While his comments, which focussed on the independence movements in 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), might in retrospect appear overwrought, when they are set against the 
larger picture of African politics in the early 1960s it is understandable that struggles for national 
political rights might be framed by visions of armageddon. As Scott acknowledged, the crises in the 
Congo and Algeria had demonstrated the dangers of ‘constitutional breakdown’   
For transnational peace activists, the nuclear threat was immanent in their conception of an 
inter-connected world. But the reality of global interconnectedness remained even after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis and subsequent moves towards international agreement to limit weapons tests, when 
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the receding threat of imminent nuclear conflict made transnational anti-nuclear weapons 
campaigns arguably less urgent. The conventional geopolitics of the Cold War were sufficient in 
themselves to limit the options for newly-independent post-colonial states, as Nkrumah himself was 
increasingly aware. His vision of Ghana as the focus of a pan-African movement became less 
tenable as the nation-state became fixed as the sole legitimate structure for political geography. The 
coup d’état that removed Nkrumah from power in 1966 signalled the closing of a moment of 
supranational possibilities that the Sahara protest sought to embody.  
The Sahara protest drew together intertwined, yet separate strands of social movement 
activity and although the campaign originated in an emergent pan-European anti-nuclear 
movement, the links between European networks were weak and fragile. Instead, networks of 
pacifists and religious organisations that connected British with US anti-nuclear movements 
facilitated the transnational campaign.  These two movement traditions were held together in the 
matrix of Gandhian non-violent civil disobedience, a fusion of somewhat contrasting political 
ideologies with shared convictions as to the effectiveness of a particular form of protest. Crucially, 
these trans-Atlantic networks were also more closely linked with pan-African anti-colonial circuits, 
which facilitated the generation of a transnational campaign against the French tests. Although 
these networks enabled the mobilisation of protest across national boundaries and individual 
European campaigners were able to align themselves with African leaders, it was not possible to 
develop any meaningful imagined solidarity between European and African movements. In the 
interactions between European movements and the politics of ‘emerging’ nation states in Africa, 
transnationalism crystallised in the form of networks that facilitated connections between nation 
states, rather than the kind of communities that Clavin has envisaged, with ‘open, porous, revisable 
and interactive’ boundaries.90  
Although western peace campaigners found common cause with African political leaders and 
activists in their protests against ‘nuclear imperialism’, conflicting claims to cosmopolitan ideals 
and the more particular national or regional agendas of African leaders worked against the creation 
and maintenance of effective and long-standing transnational movements. The ‘routinization of the 
nation-state’ had closed down avenues for global activism that seemed viable for a moment in 1959. 
The networks that facilitated transnational protest were unable to forge movements that transcended 
the borders of the colonial/post-colonial state in the name of nationalist ambition, pan-African 
idealism and universal philosophies of peace and justice. Moreover, these histories do not suggest 
that ‘transnational narratives’ are shaped by western conceptions of modernity but, as Wendy Kozol 
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has argued, ‘reveal modernity to be a multifaceted process whereby political, economic, and 
cultural exchanges occur in varied and often unpredictable ways’.91 European direct-action peace 
movements should be understood as being shaped by their engagement with, rather than their 
distinctions from anti-colonial nationalism in Africa.  
The campaigns against ‘nuclear imperialism’ ultimately reflect the limits of transnational anti-
nuclear campaigns in Europe and worldwide, but they also illustrate how the language of ‘global’ 
protest began to coalesce through the cross-border interactions of activist networks. The Sahara 
protest and the conferences that followed failed to bring a halt to French nuclear weapons tests, but 
the efforts to create an international movement against the tests shaped a practice of transnational 
activism that could be adopted, adapted and re-interpreted in particular national and local contexts. 
The limits of transnationalism can be seen, however, in the interaction between these different 
spheres of activity, and in particular, the tension between global and national agendas. The 
contradictions between the language of anti-nuclear pacifism and national liberation were brought 
into the open at the ‘Positive Action’ conference in 1960 illustrate the dilemma of western activists 
seeking to marry anti-colonial and pacifist campaigns. Peace, together with concerns for Africa, and 
the Third World more generally, became mooring-points in western New Left thinking, nurtured in 
post-war imperial decline. However, the realities of post-independence politics in Africa proved to 
be a constraint on the ambitions of western activists who had been inspired by the struggle against 
colonialism.  The interests of independent post-colonial states were not conducive to cross-border 
movements beyond support for particular national agendas and struggles – while the struggle 
against ‘nuclear imperialism’ exemplified the possibilities for a unified struggle for peace, 
democratic freedom and civil rights, it also demonstrated a widening gap between the politics of 
protest in the west and the politics of the post-colonial state. Transnational anti-nuclear peace 
activism was shaped at the meeting-point between international pacifist networks and pan-
Africanism liberation struggles.  
It was, furthermore, in the interactions of global networks of activists, rather than the 
development of movements across national boundaries that the transnational dimension of cold war 
peace movements emerged. By 1962, it seems that transnational peace activism was being 
channelled through groups such as SANE and CND who saw national governments, political parties 
and international organisations as a key focus of campaign activity. While grassroots direct action 
had inspired campaigns such as the Sahara Protest, it was less valuable for transnational activism 
oriented towards the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN-sponsored Geneva disarmament 
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conferences. Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah found ‘positive action’ less viable as a pan-Africanist 
policy option as nationalist movements reluctantly turned to armed struggle, and as African Unity 
was transformed from an ideology of liberation to the organisation of continental diplomacy.   
Nevertheless, while local, regional and national contexts continued to matter, the transnational 
connections that were developed through the processes of challenging the nuclear arms race and 
European colonialism constituted a new arena for the politics of communicative and contentious 
action. The Sahara protestors, although foiled in their attempts to infiltrate international borders, 
helped to give form to a political space that fostered the transmissions of values of social justice, 
human rights and environmental concern across the boundaries of the nation state. 
